We study the problem of restricting the information available to the sender in Bayesian persuasion problems. If the receiver has a binary choice, we can characterize the "optimal information restriction," which maximizes the equilibrium payoff of the receiver among all the information restrictions for the sender. We prove that, whenever some information restriction benefits the receiver, the optimal information restriction coincides with an equilibrium of the game in which the receiver persuades the sender. The applications include online privacy regulation and the delegation of persuasion.
Introduction
There are many settings of economic interest in which one player (sender) discloses information to the other player (receiver) who will take an action which affects the payoffs of both players.
In the literature, the sender's initial information is often exogenously given. While this is an innocuous assumption in some settings, there are situations in which the initial information comes from a third-party, who has a different interest from the sender.
1 For instance, if the principal delegates the sender (agent) to persuade the receiver, then the sender's initial information would be influenced more or less by the principal. In another instance, for an online advertiser who communicates the product information to consumers, the initial information can be restricted by a privacy regulation which prevents the advertiser to use consumers' personal information. Now, if the preference of the third-party is different from that of the sender, can the third-party benefit by making the sender less informed?
In particular, what if it cares more about the receiver than the sender? To answer these questions, we study whether we can make the sender less informed to benefit the receiver in Bayesian persuasion problems.
Bayesian persuasion studies situations in which Sender (she) chooses an information disclosure rule to change the action of Receiver (he) by influencing his belief about the state of the world. Now, consider how the information potentially available to Sender affects the welfare of both players. On the one hand, it is always profitable for Sender to have more information, because it expands the set of information structures that she can choose. 2 On the other hand, it is not clear whether Receiver's equilibrium payoff is higher if Sender is more informed. Although Receiver benefits if Sender discloses more information in the equilibrium, Sender may garble the information in a more elaborate way to change Receiver's action in favor of Sender. A broad objective of this paper is to study the value of Sender's initial information to Receiver in strategic information transmission. Specifically, we study whether we can make Sender strictly less informed to benefit Receiver, using the Bayesian persuasion framework (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) . To see the idea of "restricting the information of the sender" more concretely, consider the following example.
Example 1. There is an online advertiser of product A and a consumer of product B. The consumer is not informed about the value of product A. The advertiser communicates the information about product A through its ad in the hope that the consumer switches to product A from B.
2 We can prove that having more information is valuable to Sender in the similar way as Shmaya (2006) . Namely, a function which maps Sender's information (precisely defined below) to her equilibrium payoff in the Bayesian persuasion game is (i) increasing in the Blackwell order and (ii) concave. Point (i) follows from the fact that more informed Sender has larger set of signals, and that Sender has commitment power. Point (ii) holds because Sender can always disclose which information structure Sender is endowed with.
zero. Now, suppose that the advertiser knows types of consumers whom product A matches well, but
does not know about those who should not switch to A. We can express this advertiser's lack of information by assuming that she can distinguish only whether ω = 1 or ω ∈ {2, 3}. 5 In this case, her optimal disclosure rule is to send one message at ω = 1 and another message at ω = 2 and 3.
The consumer's best response is to adopt product A only upon receiving the first message, which
gives him a payoff of 1. As a result, the advertiser obtains the ex ante payoff of 1/3 < 2/3, and the consumer obtains the ex ante payoff of 1/3 > 0. Thus, the consumer gets a higher payoff from the advertiser who is less informed.
Note that this way of restricting the advertiser's information is best for the consumer, because the consumer obtains the best possible payoff. Also, we can confirm that the same outcome arises as an equilibrium of the game in which the consumer persuades the advertiser. Namely, if the consumer chooses µ and the advertiser takes an action (a = 0 or a = 1), then the consumer lets the advertiser know only whether ω = 1 or not, and the advertiser chooses a = 1 only at ω = 1. We will see that this observation is true for any Bayesian persuasion problems in which the receiver's choice is binary.
We start the analysis by considering a Bayesian persuasion model in which Sender's information is explicitly given as a primitive of the model. Our goal is to design the information structure from which Sender learns about the state, so that Receiver's equilibrium payoff is maximized.
While the general information restriction problem is mathematically hard to solve, we can characterize the solution whenever Receiver's choice is binary. Indeed, it coincides with either Sender's equilibrium strategy in the original Bayesian persuasion, or Receiver's equilibrium strategy of the game in which Receiver persuades Sender, whichever gives Receiver a higher payoff.
This characterization allows us to derive the optimal information restriction in a linear payoff environment analogous to Kolotilin et al. (2015) . We demonstrate that for the information restriction 5 Since the advertiser's choice of information structure is made before her observing ω, a more precise way of saying this is as follows: the seller does not have a piece of information which effectively lets the consumer learn only whether ω = 3 or not.
to be effective, it has to be the case that Sender sufficiently cares about Receiver's welfare.
The paper most related to ours is Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) . While they focus on the condition under which Sender benefits from an non-trivial persuasion, we focus on the condition under which making Sender less informed benefits Receiver.
More broadly, the growing literature of "information design" problem is related (for instance, see Taneva (2015) and Bergemann and Morris (2016) ). A crucial difference between these papers and this paper is the underlying game on which the information structure is designed. In the literature, the baseline games are often static incomplete information games, such as auctions (Bergemann and Pesendorfer, 2007) , single agent decision making (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) , and linear best response games with normal signals (Bergemann and Morris (2013) and others). In this paper, the subject of the information design problem is the Bayesian persuasion, which itself is an information design problem. This "nested information design problem" requires the analysis different from the standard information design problem in two aspects. First, the persuasion game is an extensive form game, which has no general procedure to find the optimal information structure yet. 6 Second, and more importantly, the set of strategies (signals) that Sender can choose is affected by the information structure chosen by the designer. (Indeed, shrinking the strategy space of Sender by limiting her information is the only channel through which the designer can change Receiver's equilibrium payoff.) Therefore, the standard assumption of the literature-the action sets are independent of the information structure-is violated.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a basic setting, and shows that we can focus on a simple class of information restrictions without loss of generality. Section 3 characterizes the optimal information restriction when Receiver has a binary choice. Section 4 proves that the optimal information restriction satisfies a certain notion of efficiency. In Section 5, we focus on a linear payoff model, and derives the optimal information restriction. In particular, we
show that for the information restriction to benefit Receiver, it is necessary that Sender sufficiently cares about Receiver's payoff. Section 6 discusses the applications in the context of Internet privacy 6 Taneva (2015) provides a general approach which derives the optimal information structure for the static finite incomplete information games.
regulation and delegation of persuasion. Section 7 provides results about information restriction with a general action space, and Section 8 concludes.
Setup
Receiver's action set is given by a finite set A, and the set of states is given by Ω. The payoff function of Sender and that of Receiver are given by v(a, ω) and u(a, ω), respectively. They share a common prior b 0 ∈ ∆(Ω). 7 Sender's initial information is given by a function
where Ω S is the set of message realizations on which Sender's signal (defined below) can be contingent. The benchmark case is the standard Bayesian persuasion in which Sender is fully informed: Ω S = Ω and µ I (ω) = δ ω , where δ ω is the Dirac measure on ω. (We denote this fully informative signal by µ F .) At the other extreme, we can describe Sender who has no information to communicate, by setting Ω S to be a singleton. All the primitives presented so far are assumed to be common knowledge.
Sender's strategy is a signal µ : Ω S → ∆(X) with the set of signal realizations X. 8 Note that the domain of µ is not Ω, but Ω S , meaning that Sender can only choose a signal that is measurable with respect to her information.
The timing of moves is as follows:
1. Sender chooses her strategy (X, µ).
2. Nature draws ω ∼ b 0 , ω S ∼ µ I (ω), and then x ∼ µ(ω S ).
3. Receiver observes µ and a realized x ∈ X, and updates his belief on ∆(Ω) according to Bayes' rule.
4. Receiver takes an action a ∈ A.
5. Sender's payoff v(a, ω) and Receiver's payoff u(a, ω) realize.
7 For any set X, ∆(X) denotes the set of probability measures over X. 8 Throughout the paper, µ is called a signal, and an element of X is called a signal realization. In the literature, a signal is also called an information structure, information disclosure rule, or information system.
Our solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium which maximizes Sender's payoff. If there are multiple equilibria that give the same payoff to Sender, we assume the one which maximizes
Receiver's payoff is chosen. Note that this selection uniquely pins down the equilibrium payoffs of the players.
9
Note that Sender's signal and her information are mathematically the same object, which is a function from Ω (or Ω S ) to ∆(Y ) with some set Y . Hereafter, we call any function µ :
Whenever Y ⊂ A, we call µ a straightforward signal, and an element of Y an action recommendation.
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Given an equilibrium, we can construct a signal µ * which assigns the action distribution of
We call such µ * the (equilibrium) action distribution.
Limiting Sender's Information
Throughout the analysis, we fix all the primitives but Sender's information, µ I . Now, by changing µ I , we can think of the collection of Bayesian persuasion problems that are different only in how Sender's information is given. Our goal is to find Sender's information µ * I : Ω → ∆(Ω * S ) which maximizes Receiver's equilibrium payoff among all µ I 's.
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Note that µ * I is always less informative than the fully informative signal µ F in the sense of Blackwell (1953) , and the standard models use µ F as Sender's information. Thus, we can interpret µ * I as a restriction on Sender's information which benefits Receiver most. We call such µ * I an optimal information restriction (which means Receiver-optimal way to restrict Sender's information).
Hereafter, we use "Sender's information" and an "information restriction" interchangeably. 9 Hereafter, by "the equilibrium," we mean an equilibrium selected in this way. 10 Our definition of straightforward signal is slightly different from that of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) , in that we do not require the signal to be incentive compatible for Receiver.
11 Another way to interpret our goal is to think of it as a maximization problem in which the objective function is a mapping which assigns Receiver's equilibrium payoff to an information structure specifying Sender's information.
The domain of the mapping is equal to the set of the signals.
Simplification
In principle, the problem of finding the optimal µ I can be complex. First, given Sender's information, the game can have multiple equilibria, though they are identical up to the payoffs of the players (because of our selection rule). Second, the set of information restrictions µ I , which is mathematically equal to the set of the signals, is huge. In this section, we provide two results that help us narrow down the class of equilibria as well as the games that we should focus on.
The first result enables us to focus only on the equilibrium such that Sender uses a straightforward signal.
Lemma 1 (From Proposition 1 in Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011 By Lemma 1 and 2, without loss of generality, we can focus on the game in which (i) Sender's information is given by a straightforward signal, (ii) Sender discloses all the information, and (iii)
Receiver follows the action recommendation.
Binary Action Model
In this section, we derive the optimal information restriction assuming that Receiver's choice is
Given a straightforward signal µ : Ω → ∆(A), let µ(·|a) ∈ ∆(Ω) represent the conditional distribution on Ω after observing a signal realization a ∈ A, which is calculated by Bayes' rule.
Also, let P µ (a) ≡ Ω µ(a|ω)db 0 (ω) denote the ex-ante probability that a signal realization a ∈ {0, 1} arises.
Because Receiver's choice is binary, we can normalize v(0, ω) = u(0, ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
Also, we denote u(1, ω) and v(1, ω) by u(ω) and v(ω), respectively. Under these normalizations, if Sender chooses a straightforward signal µ and Receiver follows the action recommendation, then the ex-ante payoffs of Sender and Receiver are given by (ω|1), respectively. Moreover, we can write Receiver's payoff from a = 1 conditional on observing the signal realization 1 ∈ A as
and the payoff from a = 1 conditional on observing 0 as
Here, the first equality follows from the law of total probability
and the second equality is from (1).
Given these expressions, Receiver follows the action recommendation of a straightforward signal µ if and only if
which reduces to
In other words, a straightforward signal µ is incentive compatible for Receiver if and only if the ex ante payoff from µ is greater than the payoff he can achieve by taking a = 0 or a = 1 deterministically. 13 Note that a similar condition holds for any Bayesian persuasion problem. Namely, the equilibrium payoff of Receiver is always greater than the payoff he can achieve by a deterministic policy, because Receiver can always ignore the information provided by Sender. If Receiver has a binary choice, this condition turns out to be sufficient for the incentive compatibility, regardless of Ω.
14 Similarly, if Sender's information is given by a straightforward signal µ, Sender is willing to communicate all the information if
whenever Receiver obeys the action recommendation of the signal µ. Note that this constraint is sufficient but not necessary for Sender to be willing to communicate all the information. This is because Sender has full commitment power. Now, we derive the optimal information restriction in binary action case. The following result shows that we can derive the optimal information restriction by solving two Bayesian persuasion problems. One is the original game with the fully informed Sender. The other is the "flipped game"
in which Receiver chooses a signal and Sender takes an action.
To state the result, let u BP ∈ R be Receiver's ex ante expected payoff from the Bayesian persuasion problem with the fully informed Sender. Let u * be Receiver's ex ante expected payoff 13 Note that this is valid even if µ(a|ω) = 1 for any ω, although P µ (a ) = 0 for a = a. 14 A similar calculation appears in Alonso and Câmara (2015) .
from the game in which the fully informed Receiver chooses a signal and Sender takes an action.
Also, let µ * : Ω → ∆(A) denote Receiver's equilibrium signal of this game.
Theorem 1. Suppose |A| = 2. Then, the following holds.
1. Receiver's equilibrium payoff under the optimal information restriction is equal to max {u BP , u * }.
2. If u * > u BP , then the optimal information restriction is given by µ * .
3. If u * ≤ u BP , then it is optimal not to restrict Sender's information.
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Proof. Note that if Receiver persuades Sender by choosing a signal, Receiver solves the following maximization problem.
Then µ * and u * are the maximizer and maximized value of this problem, respectively.
Let µ OP T : Ω → ∆(A) denote the optimal information restriction. By Lemma 1 and 2, we can assume that, under µ OP T , Sender communicates all the information and Receiver follows the action recommendation. Also, let
To show Point 2, suppose that u * > u BP . We show that this implies u
then µ * satisfies both the incentive constraint of Sender and that of Receiver: Sender's constraint is satisfied because µ * satisfies (3). Receiver's constraint holds because u
. This implies that µ * is one of the information restrictions under which Sender does not garble the information and Receiver follows the action recommendation. Since
Next, we show u OP T ≤ u * . To prove this, it is enough to show that u OP T satisfies the constraint
For example, suppose to the contrary that v OP T < 0. This implies that Sender wants Receiver to take action 0 when Receiver is supposed to take action 1 under µ OP T . (Recall that the ex ante payoff v OP T is proportional to the payoff from a = 1 conditional on observing the signal realization a = 1.) This implies that Sender has the incentive to garble µ OP T . Specifically, Sender is better off by modifying µ OP T so that the new signal sends a signal realization a = 0 with a small probability p when µ OP T is supposed to send a = 1. This continues to satisfy Receiver's IC as long as p is small enough, since Receiver's IC under µ OP T holds strictly.
Since this garbling increases Sender's ex ante expected payoff by −v OP T · p > 0, she has the incentive to garble µ OP T . Similarly, we can show that v OP T < Ω v(ω)db 0 (ω) implies that Sender is willing to garble µ OP T , which is a contradiction. Thus,
satisfied, and thus u * ≥ u OP T . Therefore, u * = u OP T . Since µ * satisfies the incentive constraint of Sender and that of Receiver, µ * gives the equilibrium payoff of u * to Receiver.
To show Point 3, suppose that u * ≤ u BP . Suppose to the contrary that u OP T > u BP : the optimal information restriction is different from no restriction, which gives u BP . Then, the same argument as above implies that µ OP T satisfies v OP T ≥ max Ω v(ω)db 0 (ω), 0 , and thus u * ≥ u OP T . This leads to u * > u BP , which is a contradiction. Therefore, if u * ≤ u BP , it is optimal for Receiver not to restrict Sender's information.
Point 1 follows from Point 2 and 3.
Theorem 1 gives a short answer to the question that how the optimal information restriction looks like: the optimal information restriction does not allow Sender to learn the information that Receiver would not disclose if he were to persuade Sender.
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The following result states that, if Sender's payoff is independent of the state, then no information restriction benefits Receiver.
Corollary 1. Suppose that v(ω) is independent of ω. Then, it is optimal for Receiver not to restrict Sender's information.
Proof. If v(ω) is independent of ω, the action chosen by Sender in the flipped game is independent of ω. Thus, Receiver's payoff in the original Bayesian persuasion problem is higher than the payoff in the flipped game. By Theorem 1, the optimal information restriction is no restriction.
Intuitively, if Sender prefers one action to the other independently of the state, no matter how we restrict her information, Sender always garble the information to drive down Receiver's payoff to the payoff from a deterministic policy. Thus, no information restriction gives Receiver a payoff strictly above the lower bound.
4 Further Characterization
Efficiency Property
In this section, we show that an equilibrium of Bayesian persuasion satisfies a certain efficiency property whenever |A| = 2. This implies that the outcome of the optimal information restriction is efficient, which allows us to characterize the optimal restriction concisely.
The efficiency is formally defined as follows. It requires that the equilibrium payoff vector is not Pareto dominated by any outcome that the players can achieve without transfer.
• An equilibrium is constrained efficient if there is noμ : Ω S → ∆(A) which Pareto dominates the equilibrium action distribution µ * : Ω S → ∆(A).
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• An equilibrium is efficient if there is noμ : Ω → ∆(A) which Pareto dominates the equilib-
The following result states that whenever |A| = 2, the equilibrium is (constrained) efficient.
Proposition 1. Fix Sender's information µ I : Ω → ∆(Ω S ), and suppose that |A| = 2. Then, the equilibrium is constrained efficient. If the Sender is fully informed, then the equilibrium is efficient.
, and at least one of the inequalities is strict.
Proof. Let S I ≡ ∆(A) Ω S be Sender's strategy space, i.e., the set of straightforward signalsμ : Ω S → ∆(A) consistent with Sender's information µ I . Let µ * be Sender's equilibrium strategy, which can be assumed to be straightforward without loss of generality. Then, µ * is a solution of the following problem:
Now, if µ ∈ S I satisfies the constraint and µ ∈ S I Pareto dominates µ, then µ gives a higher payoff to Sender than µ without violating the constraint. Thus, there is a solution µ * which is
Pareto undominated by any µ ∈ S I . Therefore, the equilibrium is constraint efficient.
If Sender is fully informed, then S I is the set of all the signals µ : Ω → ∆(A). Thus, the equilibrium is efficient.
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 imply that
Proposition 2. The equilibrium under the optimal information restriction is efficient.
Proof. Proposition 1 implies that the game in which Sender persuades Receiver and the game in which Receiver persuades Sender lead to the efficient outcomes. Now, Theorem 1 states that the outcome under the optimal information restriction is equal to one of these. Thus, it is efficient. Figure 1 illustrates the case in which the optimal information restriction strictly benefits Receiver. The convex set delineated by the thick black line is the set of the feasible payoff vectors, which is formally written as
where S ≡ ∆(A) Ω is the set of the straightforward signals. Thus, V depends only on the primitives of the original persuasion problem, and it does not take into account neither information restriction nor the incentives of the players. The blue horizontal line represents max Ω u(ω)db 0 (ω), 0 .
Thus, any µ which gives a payoff vector above this line is incentive compatible for Receiver.
Similarly, the red vertical line represents max Ω v(ω)db 0 (ω), 0 .
If Sender is fully informed, then she chooses a signal to maximize her own payoff subject to Receiver's IC. Thus, the point of "Full Information" in the figure realizes. Theorem 1 states that we can restrict Sender's information so that the outcome maximizes Receiver's payoff subject to
Sender's IC. Thus, the optimal information restriction moves the equilibrium payoff vector from one point to another point of Pareto frontier. Similarly to the previous figure, if Sender is fully informed, the outcome maximizes the Sender's payoff subject to Receiver's IC, which is the blue line. Now, in this figure, Receiver's payoff that he could obtain by persuading Sender gives a lower payoff than the original persuasion game. Thus, there is no information restriction which strictly benefits Receiver.
Simple Characterization
This subsection characterizes the optimal information restriction concisely by exploiting the efficiency property in Proposition 1. This characterization allows us to see what kind of information Sender can (not) observe under the optimal information restriction. Also, the characterization To characterize the optimal restriction concisely, we introduce the following notation and assumption.
Intuitively, Assumption 1 requires that there is no flat region or a kink on the Pareto frontier of V . The standard argument implies that the action distribution µ is efficient if and only if µ = µ α for some α ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 3. µ ∈ S is efficient if and only if µ = µ α for some α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. "if" part follows from the construction of µ α . To show "only if" part, note that S is convex, and thus the set of feasible payoff vectors V is convex. The convexity of V and the separating hyperplane theorem imply the existence of α ∈ [0, 1]. 
. Now, define a partial order on S as follows. For any µ, µ ∈ S, define µ µ if and only if
Now, let S E denote the set of the efficient µ's. Then,
has the increasing differences in (α, µ) with the order * defined as (α, µ) * (α , µ ) if and only if α ≥ α and µ µ . This implies that if α ≥ α , then µ α µ α . Therefore, the payoff of Receiver (Sender) is higher (lower) under µ α than µ α . Now, we are ready to state the result.
Proposition 3. Define α S , α R , and α * as follows.
Then, the following holds.
1. µ α * is the optimal information restriction.
2. Restricting Sender's information can be strictly beneficial for Receiver if and only if α S < α R .
Proof. Under Assumption 1, α S and α R exactly achieve the infimum and supremum, respectively.
By Theorem 1, it is enough to show that µ α S is the action distribution of the game in which the fully informed Sender persuades Receiver, and µ α R is that of the flipped game. By Proposition 1, Sender's equilibrium signal is equal to the best straightforward signal among those that are efficient and satisfy Receiver's IC. By Lemma 3 and 4, µ α S satisfy these conditions. Similarly, µ α R is the signal that Receiver chooses in the game where Receiver persuades Sender. Second, assume that α S ≥ α R . If α < α S , then µ α violates Receiver's constraint. α > α S is not sustainable as an equilibrium outcome either, by the same argument as the case of α S < α R and α > α R . Finally, µ α S is an equilibrium outcome of the game in which no information restriction is imposed. Therefore, only α = α S is consistent with an equilibrium.
Therefore, if W is increasing in (u, v), this information design problem is equivalent to solving
For instance, if the designer aims for maximizing the total surplus E µα [u] + E µα [v] , then the designer chooses µ 1/2 if 1/2 ∈ [α S , α * ]. Otherwise, µ α S is chosen if 1/2 < α S , and µ α * is chosen if 1/2 > α * .
Linear Payoff Environments
The purpose of the analysis here is to demonstrate how we use the previous results to derive the optimal information restriction, as well as to see how Receiver's benefit from the information restriction depends on the preference disagreement of Sender and Receiver. The model is analogous to the one used in Kolotilin et al. (2015) .
Receiver's action is a ∈ {0, 1}. ωdb 0 (ω) < 0, so that Receiver takes action a = 0 if no information is provided. For any efficient action distribution, there exists a cutoff ω * ∈ Ω above which a = 1 is taken, and below which a = 0 is taken.
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Now, we derive the two cutoffs corresponding to the two Bayesian persuasion problems. First, consider the original game in which the fully informed Sender persuades Receiver. Define ω S < 0
Note that Receiver is indifferent between a = 0 and a = 1, conditional on the event {ω ∈ Ω : ω > ω S }. Receiver achieves a payoff of 0, which is a lower bound of Receiver's payoff in any equilibrium.
Finally, Receiver's equilibrium payoff is increasing ρ because the negative cutoff max(ω S , − 1 ρ ) above which a = 1 is taken gets closer to zero as ρ increases.
Next, define ω R (ρ) by
Note that ω R (ρ) is increasing in ρ, since −1/ρ is increasing in ρ and E[ω|ω < x] is increasing in x. In particular, ω R (ρ) can be positive for a large ρ. A similar argument as the previous claim establishes the following.
Claim 2. In the equilibrium of the game in which Receiver chooses a signal and Sender takes an action, Sender takes a = 1 if and only if ω ≥ min{0, ω R (ρ)}. Receiver's equilibrium payoff of this game is increasing in ρ.
Finally, define ρ * and ρ * * implicitly by ω R (ρ * ) = ω S and ω R (ρ * * ) = 0, respectively. ρ * < ρ
Proof. By Claim 1 and 2, Receiver's payoffs from the original game and the flipped game are increasing in ρ. Since Receiver's equilibrium payoff under the optimal information restriction is the maximum of the two, it is increasing in ρ.
Thus, Receiver's equilibrium payoff is higher in the game where Sender chooses a signal. Since − 1 ρ < ω R (ρ) by construction, we obtain − 1 ρ < ω S . Thus, Sender chooses a signal which discloses whether ω > ω S or not, and Receiver obtains an ex ante payoff of zero.
If ρ * < ρ, then Receiver's payoff is strictly higher in the game where Receiver himself chooses a signal. In particular, if ρ ≥ ρ * * , then Receiver can achieve the maximum attainable payoff in this game, because Sender (whose role is a receiver) takes a = 1 if and only if ω ≥ 0.
Note that, if Sender is fully informed, Receiver's equilibrium payoff is strictly below E[max(ω, 0)]
for any ρ. This is because, for any ρ, Sender chooses a signal which makes Receiver take a = 1 for ω's which are negative but sufficiently close to 0. There are a monotonicity and non-monotonicity in Receiver's benefit from the information restriction, as a function of ρ. First, Receiver's payoff from the optimal information restriction is monotonically increasing in ρ. Second, Receiver's net benefit, which is Receiver's payoff from the optimal restriction minus the one from no restriction, is non-monotone in ρ. Specifically, we can find c 1 < c 2 < d 1 < d 2 such that the net benefit is strictly increasing on (c 1 , c 2 ) and is strictly
The above analysis provides one condition under which an information restriction can benefit Receiver: the information restriction can benefit Receiver only if Sender sufficiently cares about
Receiver's payoff. The initial intuition might suggest that an information restriction would be effective if Sender greatly benefits from persuasion. The analysis shows that this is not the case, because Sender's benefit from persuasion shrinks as their preferences are more aligned, while ρ must be high enough for the optimal information restriction to be beneficial.
Applications

Privacy Regulation on Internet Advertising
One application of the model is the design of privacy regulation, in particular for online advertisers and platforms. As described in the literature, online advertisers as well as advertising platforms can have the incentive to communicate information selectively to consumers to increase the probability of purchase or clicking more profitable ads. 21 In this setting, the advertiser and the consumer are respectively the sender and the receiver. u(ω) represents the match value between individual consumers and the ad, while v(ω) represents the advertiser's profit from clicking. Now, given that ω specifies the match value between the consumer and the ad, limiting information about the consumer's profile, such as his browsing history, is likely to give the advertiser coarser information about ω. 22 If we can restrict the advertiser's information in an arbitrary way 21 See, for instance, Rayo and Segal (2010) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) . 22 For example, a strict privacy regulation might prevent the advertiser from learning about what types of consumers have high match value with the advertisement. If this is the case, the advertiser ends up with having less information to communicate to the future consumers. In contrast, if the advertiser is allowed to observe the detailed personal information of consumers who did (or did not) click the ad, then it can easily learn the types of users with which the ad has high valuation. Given such information, the advertiser can construct an advertisement (signal) which effectively influences the prospective consumers' behavior.
through a privacy regulation, what does the ideal regulation achieve?
First, the ideal regulation should allow the advertiser to distinguish ω and ω such that u(ω), v(ω) > 0 and u(ω ), v(ω ) < 0. In other words, the restriction does not pool two states if the advertiser and the consumer agree about the ideal action at each of the states, and the ideal actions are different between the two states.
Second, we can interpret the optimal information restriction as an attempt to switch the advertiser's behavior from negative targeting to positive targeting. To see this more concretely, assume
that Ω = {1, 2, 3}, u(1), v(1) > 0, v(2) > 0 > u(2), and 0 > u(3), v(3). At ω = 2, the consumer has a better outside opportunity, but the advertiser still wants him to click the ad, because of (say) its high Per-click profit. Now, an efficient action distribution µ α is typically to take a = 1 whenever
Under no information restriction, Proposition 3 implies that α is set to be low (compared to the optimal restriction). In particular, if α is low enough, the advertiser lets the consumer know only whether ω = 3 or not. This is similar to negative targeting, where an advertiser avoids contacting low value customers (ω = 3) and contacts everyone else (ω = 1, 2).
In contrast, the optimal information restriction sets α relatively high. In particular, for sufficiently high α, the consumer is informed of only whether ω = 1 or not, which can be interpreted as positive targeting: an advertiser contacts high value customers and excludes everyone else. In this case, the regulation restricts the information available to the advertiser, so that it cannot distinguish whether the consumer has the middle valuation (ω = 2) or the lowest valuation (ω = 3). As a result, the advertiser chooses to target only the high valuation consumer (ω = 1).
Delegated Persuasion
Consider a manger who hired a sale agent to persuade her customers to buy the product. While the manager cares about the customer's payoff because of reputational concern, the sales agent is myopic, and he tends to maximize his sales. However, the manager cannot directly observe how the sales agent communicates with a customer. Now, is it possible for the manager to mitigate the moral hazard problem by restricting information available to the sales agent? In this example, the optimal information restriction specifies the pieces of information that the manager should allow the agent to use in the persuasion, so that the customer's payoff is maximized.
Proposition 4 implies that, if the sales agent cares about the customer's payoff, then the information restriction can improve the customer's payoff. Now, even if the sales agent does not intrinsically care about the customer, a combination of payment scheme and an information restriction can work. For instance, the manager can make the salary contingent on the customer feedback, so that the agent who maximizes his earnings behaves as if he cares about the customer. (Alternatively, the manager may give the agent the incentive to maintain reputation.)
Our results suggest that restricting the agent's information can complement this incentive scheme and improve the customer's payoff further. For instance, the manager may let the agent know the type of customers whose valuation of the product is very high. At the same time, she may suppress the information which allows the agent to distinguish the customers who value the product moderately and who do not. Even when the payment scheme alone is not enough to resolve the moral hazard problem, combining it with an information restriction can achieve the goal of the manager.
Discussion
Information Restriction with General |A|
Assume that A is any finite set. We provide a sufficient condition under which there is some way to restrict Sender's information to increase Receiver's equilibrium payoff.
For the ease of exposition, we borrow some notations from Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) . 23 Finally, let Supp(µ) ⊂ ∆(Ω) denote the set of posteriors that can arise (with a positive ex ante probability) under a signal µ. Therefore, the image of Supp(µ) byâ,â(Supp(µ)) ⊂ A, is the set of actions that can be chosen with positive probabilities, if Sender chooses a signal µ.
23 Recall that the tie is broken in favor of Sender.
The first result provides a sufficient condition under which restricting Sender's information can benefit Receiver, in the sense that Receiver's payoff is strictly higher under the restriction than the game in which Sender can choose an arbitrary signal. (By abuse of notation, µ(·|a) ∈ ∆(Ω) represents the conditional distribution over Ω after observing a ∈ A given a straightforward signal µ and the prior b 0 .)
Proposition 5. Let (µ * , u * ) solve the following problem.
Then, Receiver strictly benefits from some information restriction if u * > u BP , where u BP is Receiver's equilibrium payoff given the fully informed Sender who can choose any signal.
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Proof. It is enough to show that, if Sender's information is given by a straightforward signal µ * , then Sender communicates all the information, and Receiver obeys the action recommendation.
Indeed, by (8), Receiver obeys the action recommendation if Sender communicates all the information from µ * . Next, equation (7) implies that, after receiving a message a (from Nature), Sender's preferred action is a. Thus, even if she could choose a ∈ A by herself (ignoring Receiver's incentive constraint), Sender would still choose action a ∈ A. This immediately implies that no garbling can be strictly better for Sender than communicating all the information. Therefore, the information restriction µ * yields a higher payoff to Receiver than the payoff given the fully informed Sender.
The following corollary allows us to check whether some information restriction can be beneficial, when we already know the equilibrium with the fully informed Sender. (ii)â(Supp(µ * )) = A, i.e., each action is used with a positive probability, and (iii) for each b ∈ Supp(µ * ), Sender's preference is discrete at b, in the sense that
Then, there exists a signal µ I such that Receiver's payoff strictly increases if Sender's information is given by µ I , instead of µ F .
Proof. In the following, we assume that Ω is a finite set, but the proof extends to the case of a general measurable space. Let µ * denote the signal chosen by the fully informed Sender. Note that µ * is strictly less informative than µ F , because Receiver's payoff is strictly lower than the payoff that he can achieve if he is fully informed. By Lemma 1, we can assume that µ * is a straightforward signal, and Receiver obeys the action recommendation. Now, we construct µ I which satisfies the constraints (7) and (8), and gives Receiver a higher payoff than u * BP . If we prove this, Proposition 5 implies that there is some information restriction beneficial to Receiver. To achieve this, let µ R denote a straightforward signal corresponding to Receiver's ideal action:
µ R sends arg max a∈A u(a, ω) at a state ω ∈ Ω for sure. Now, define µ I ≡ εµ R + (1 − ε)µ * for a sufficiently small ε > 0. Namely, µ I is a straightforward signal which draws a ∈ A with probability εµ R (a|ω) + (1 − ε)µ * (a|ω) at a state ω ∈ Ω. Note that for each a ∈ A, the conditional distribution on Ω after observing a signal realization a ∈ A is written as c a µ R (·|a)+(1−c a )µ * (·|a)
with some c a ∈ (0, 1). 25 This implies that Receiver follows the action recommendation by µ I , because he follows the action recommendation of µ * and µ R . That is, inequality (8) holds. Also, Receiver's ex-ante expected payoff given µ I is strictly greater than u * , because his payoff under µ I 25 Concretely, µ I (ω|a) is written as
Note that ω is a fixed state and ω is the integration variable.
is a convex combination of the payoffs from µ * and µ R . Also, assumptions (ii) and (iii) imply that for a sufficiently small ε, if Sender's information is given by µ I , then Sender's optimal strategy is to communicate all the information. Thus, constraint (7) is satisfied.
While the results might enable us to find the information restriction beneficial to Receiver, there are two weak points, that come from the difficulty of establishing the exact incentive compatibility constraint for Sender. First, even if the condition in Proposition 5 is violated, there may be an information restriction which strictly benefits Receiver. This is because, for Sender who has the full commitment power, the constraint (7) is sufficient but not necessary to communicate all the information from µ. Although we could obtain the "true" optimal information restriction problem by replacing (7) by the true (if and only if) constraint that Sender does not garble µ, such maximization problem is not very tractable, because the closed form of the Sender's incentive constraint
is not yet known.
Second, although the solution of the maximization problem in Proposition 5 can be used to check whether Receiver benefits from some information restriction, the solution µ * may not be the optimal information restriction even if the conditions in Proposition 5 is true. The reason is the same as the first point: since (7) is sufficient but not necessary, we may be missing another information restriction which is strictly better than µ * for Receiver.
Counterexample for |A| > 2
To demonstrate how Theorem 1 fails if |A| > 2, we present a Bayesian persuasion problem with |A| = 3 which has two features. The first is that there is no efficient equilibrium in this game.
The second is that the equilibrium of the "flipped game" does not give an optimal information restriction, while it gives a higher payoff to Receiver than the original game.
Suppose that |A| = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }, Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 }, and
is given in Table 1 .
We show that this game has no efficient equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an efficient equilibrium. First, observe that a 1 Pareto dominates the other actions at ω 1 , and is a 1 a 2 a 3 ω 1 2, 2 1, 1 0, −2 ω 2 −2, −2 1, 1 2, −2 Pareto dominated at ω 2 . Thus, for an action distribution to be efficient, a 1 must be taken if and only if ω = ω 1 . This implies that observing a signal realization after which Receiver takes action a = a 1 , he is sure that the state is ω 2 . Now, in this case, Receiver strictly prefers to take a 3 to a 2 , which implies that Sender's ex-ante expected payoff is 2−2 2 = 0. However, Sender can obtain a payoff of 1 if she communicates no information, because Receiver's preferred action is a 2 under the prior, given that he breaks tie in favor of Sender. This is a contradiction.
Indeed, Sender discloses no information in the equilibrium, which we can graphically confirm by the concavification technique in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) . This implies that Receiver's equilibrium payoff is 1 regardless of an information restriction, because Sender can always choose to disclose nothing. Receiver's equilibrium payoff in the flipped game is higher than 1, because
Receiver can obtain 3 2
by disclosing the state to Sender, who chooses a 1 and a 2 at ω 1 and ω 2 , respectively. Then, while Receiver's payoff in the flipped game is higher than the one in the original game, the outcome of the flipped game does not consist of the optimal information restriction.
Thus, Theorem 1 does not extend to a general A.
The result that there is no beneficial information restriction in this game is a special case of the result stated in the next subsection: regardless of |A|, no information restriction strictly benefits Receiver whenever |Ω| = 2.
Impossibility result for |Ω| = 2
We prove that there exists no information restriction which strictly benefits Receiver whenever |Ω| = 2, regardless of the action set of Receiver.
A rough intuition is as follows. As we saw in the introduction, an information restriction benefits Receiver by changing the way in which a state, at which Sender and Receiver disagree about the best action, is pooled. For instance, consider the state ω where Sender prefers a = 1
and Receiver prefers a = 0. Then, while Sender pools ω with another state at which Sender and
Receiver prefer a = 1, the optimal information restriction pools ω with another state where both of them prefer a = 0. Now, if there are only two states, we cannot pool states without making a signal less informative, from which Receiver obtains a lower payoff. Thus, there is no way to benefit Receiver by giving Sender coarser information. The following analysis proves this is the case for any A.
Suppose Ω = {0, 1}. Since |Ω| = 2, we can identify ∆(Ω) with the unit interval In contrast to the binary action case in which a straightforward signal simplifies the analysis, in the binary state case, it is more convenient to write a signal in terms of a distribution over posteriors
Given this way of describing a signal, the primitives of the model are written as follows.
Sender's information is given by a Bayes' plausible signal τ S , and Sender's strategy is the set of τ ∈ ∆([0, 1]) such that τ S is a mean-preserving spread of τ , i.e., τ is less informative than τ S . By the same logic as Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can prove that, upon finding the optimal information restriction, we can restrict ourselves to the games such that (i) Sender's information is given by τ S , and (ii) Sender's equilibrium strategy τ * satisfies τ * = τ S .
Because there is no restriction on |A|, we can no longer reduce Sender's (true) incentive constraint-the condition under which Sender does not want to garble the information from τ Sto tractable inequalities as in binary action cases. Formally, we define the incentive constraint as follows.
Definition 2. An information restriction τ S satisfies Sender's incentive constraint if Sender chooses τ S as an equilibrium strategy when her information is restricted to τ S .
In other words, τ S satisfies Sender's incentive constraint if it is optimal for Sender to disclose all the information from τ S given Receiver's best response. The following lemma describes the difficulty of restricting Sender's information to benefit Receiver. It claims that whenever an information restriction satisfies Sender's incentive constraint, it is less informative than the equilibrium strategy of the fully informed Sender.
Lemma 5. Assume that, given Receiver's tie-braking rule, the fully informed sender has a unique equilibrium strategy, τ BP . Take any information restriction τ S different from τ BP . If τ S satisfies Sender's incentive constraint, then τ S is less informative than τ BP .
Lemma 5 implies that any information restriction cannot be strictly better than fully informing Sender.
Proposition 6. Suppose that |Ω| = 2. Assume that, given Receiver's tie-braking rule, the fully informed sender has a unique equilibrium strategy, τ BP . Then, no information restriction is strictly beneficial for Receiver.
Proof. By Lemma 5, if an information restriction satisfies Sender's incentive constraint, then it is less informative than τ BP . Because Receiver's payoff is lower given a less informative signal, his payoff cannot be strictly higher under any information restriction.
Optimal Information Restriction for Cheap-Talk Game
While our main focus is on Bayesian persuasion, we can think of the optimal information restriction in any strategic communication games. In this subsection, we describe how the result changes if the underlying game is a cheap-talk game: Sender is privately informed of the state realization, she has no commitment power, and there is no restriction on message spaces.
First, for the cheap-talk game, the maximization problem in Proposition 5 is precisely the optimal information restriction problem, assuming that an equilibrium best for Receiver is played under any information restriction. This is because Sender's constraint (7) is a necessary and sufficient condition in a cheap-talk game.
Second, the results in binary action cases do not extend to the cheap-talk game readily. The connection between the information restriction and the flipped game-the cheap talk game in which Receiver sends a message-is not clear. In particular, there exists a game in which the optimal information restriction gives Receiver a strictly higher payoff than the original cheap-talk game and the flipped game. Also, the analogue of Proposition 1 does not hold.
However, we can prove the following. Suppose that the optimal information restriction is strictly beneficial for Receiver in a Bayesian persuasion game. That is, the flipped (persuasion) game gives Receiver a higher payoff than the original game (Theorem 1). Then, under the same information restriction, there exists a cheap-talk equilibrium which gives the same payoff to Receiver. This is because whenever the outcome of the flipped (persuasion) game is strictly better for
Receiver than the original persuasion game, this outcome satisfies the cheap-talk type constraint: has the same objective function as the optimal information restriction problem for the cheap-talk game, but has less constraints.
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the problem of restricting the sender's initial information to benefit the receiver in Bayesian persuasion. In any binary action case, we derived the optimal information restriction-the sender's initial information structure which maximizes the receiver's equilibrium payoff-by solving the original game and the "flipped" game in which the receiver persuades the sender. This provides a simple description of the optimal information restriction: it does not
give the sender the information that the receiver would not disclose if their roles are switched.
Moreover, the optimal information restriction in a binary action environment satisfies a certain notion of efficiency, which helped us to derive the optimal information restriction in a class of
